Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040zbMath1396.91122OpenAlexW2761946271MaRDI QIDQ1786787

Hayrullah Dindar, Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040

zbMATH Keywords

representative democracygroup manipulationvote pairing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

Cites Work

• On avoiding vote swapping
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of coice
• A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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