Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.023zbMath1398.91052OpenAlexW2768748812MaRDI QIDQ1787255

Pedro Jara-Moroni

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.023

zbMATH Keywords

large gamesexpectational coordinationnon-atomic gamesrationalizable strategiesstrong rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
• Comments on purification in continuum games
• Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
• Representation of finite action large games
• On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
• Integrals of set-valued functions
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge

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