On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.12.014zbMath1397.91349OpenAlexW2772896898MaRDI QIDQ1787284

Stefan Terstiege

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractsinformation disclosureBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

A note on robust procurement contracts

Cites Work

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

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