When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.12.001zbMath1397.91097OpenAlexW2775381519MaRDI QIDQ1787313

Lily Ling Yang, Tsz-Ning Wong

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionpersuasionvoluntary disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission

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