A note on ex-ante stable lotteries

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.017zbMath1397.91477OpenAlexW2773376222MaRDI QIDQ1787357

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19678/1/A%20Note%20on%20Ex-Ante%20Stable%20Lotteries.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchinglotteriesschool choiceex-ante stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities ⋮ On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts

Cites Work

• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
• A theory of school-choice lotteries

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