Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.028zbMath1397.91258OpenAlexW2793960705MaRDI QIDQ1787511

Emma Moreno-García, Javier Hervés-Estévez

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.028

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscorebargaining setsveto mechanismleader

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A consistent bargaining set
• An advantage of the bargaining set over the core
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets
• A limit result on bargaining sets
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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