Which equilibrium yields the highest expected revenue in second-price sealed-bid auctions?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.03.016zbMath1397.91262OpenAlexW2791002583WikidataQ130114222 ScholiaQ130114222MaRDI QIDQ1787584

Yusuke Inami

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.016

zbMATH Keywords

second-price sealed-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.

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