On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022zbMath1397.91240OpenAlexW2793064206MaRDI QIDQ1787585

Tamás Solymosi, Ata Atay

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/75324/1/MTDP1805.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gamebargaining setassignment gamematching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility

Cites Work

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• On Some Network Flow Games
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