Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011zbMath1397.91215OpenAlexW2800855411MaRDI QIDQ1787614

Romain Fayat, Guillaume Cheikbossian

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26023/1/wp_tse_918.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

complementaritygroup contestgroup size paradox(impure) public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (4)

Group size and group success in conflicts ⋮ Group size effects in social evolution ⋮ Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests ⋮ Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

Cites Work

• Group contest success functions

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