Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.05.010zbMath1397.91255OpenAlexW2799563354WikidataQ129891510 ScholiaQ129891510MaRDI QIDQ1787685

Christian Ewerhart, Guang-Zhen Sun

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenessrent dissipationcontestsmixed-strategy equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Solutions of neutral delay differential equations using a generalized Lambert \(W\) function ⋮ The \(n\)-player Hirshleifer contest

Cites Work

• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
• Contest success functions
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
• On the generalization of the Lambert $W$ function

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