Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.017zbMath1397.91028OpenAlexW2803107942WikidataQ129777687 ScholiaQ129777687MaRDI QIDQ1787689

André Casajus

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.017

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrystrong monotonicityShapley valueTU gamemarginalityweak differential monotonicitysign symmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues ⋮ Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

Cites Work

• Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
• Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
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