Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033zbMath1397.91470OpenAlexW2807544352WikidataQ129732290 ScholiaQ129732290MaRDI QIDQ1787700

Claus-Jochen Haake, Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityschool choicedeferred acceptance algorithmBoston mechanismtop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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