Perfect forward induction

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.008zbMath1397.91055OpenAlexW2808329007WikidataQ129654815 ScholiaQ129654815MaRDI QIDQ1787717

Chih-Chun Yang

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

permissibilityextensive-form rationalizabilityiterated admissibilityperfectforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• On a new axiomatic theory of probability
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Admissibility in Games

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