Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
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Publication:1788003
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028zbMath1397.91321OpenAlexW2810810127MaRDI QIDQ1788003
Publication date: 8 October 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.ucr.edu/repec/ucr/wpaper/201808.pdf
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Cites Work
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