Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.07.021zbMath1397.91239OpenAlexW2883455516MaRDI QIDQ1788004

Leandro Arozamena, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Federico Weinschelbaum

Publication date: 8 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.021

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built‐in menu of change orders

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions
• Dual Sourcing in Repeated Procurement Competitions

This page was built for publication: Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions