Economics of collective monitoring: a study of environmentally constrained electricity generators
DOI10.1007/s10287-015-0247-9zbMath1397.91303OpenAlexW2260602903MaRDI QIDQ1789575
Publication date: 10 October 2018
Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-015-0247-9
policy analysisgeneralised Nash equilibriumcoupled-constraints gamesderegulated electric industrypollution constraints
Noncooperative games (91A10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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