Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.05.007zbMath1397.91487OpenAlexW2010095057WikidataQ44992052 ScholiaQ44992052MaRDI QIDQ1790778

Yoh Iwasa, Joung Hun Lee

Publication date: 4 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringmixed logitcommon pool resource managementfalse accusation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (9)

Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games ⋮ Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight ⋮ Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources ⋮ Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication ⋮ The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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