Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.09.012zbMath1397.91082OpenAlexW1592901917WikidataQ50555867 ScholiaQ50555867MaRDI QIDQ1790887

Irenaeus Wolff

Publication date: 4 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-320504

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsprisoner's dilemmastrong reciprocitycounter-punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm

Cites Work

• Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Further remarks on Darwinian selection and altruism
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Voting with your feet: payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Natural selection and social preferences
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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