Abstracting Nash equilibria of supermodular games

DOI10.1007/s10703-017-0291-xzbMath1427.91014OpenAlexW2743498067MaRDI QIDQ1791275

Francesco Ranzato

Publication date: 4 October 2018

Published in: Formal Methods in System Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3242967

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaabstract interpretationsupermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

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• Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
• Power domains
• Constructive versions of Tarski's fixed point theorems
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Abstract interpretation of supermodular games
• How Hard Is It to Approximate the Best Nash Equilibrium?
• Fixed Point Theory in Ordered Sets and Applications
• On Fixed-Points of Multivalued Functions on Complete Lattices and Their Application to Generalized Logic Programs
• A Powerdomain Construction
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Systematic design of program transformation frameworks by abstract interpretation
• The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
• Abstract Interpretation Frameworks
• A new characterization of complete Heyting and co-Heyting algebras
• Making abstract interpretations complete

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