Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
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Publication:1792539
DOI10.1134/S0005117918050065zbMath1416.91068OpenAlexW2803461406MaRDI QIDQ1792539
Publication date: 12 October 2018
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117918050065
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (7)
Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty ⋮ Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks ⋮ The properties of conjectural variations in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model ⋮ Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader ⋮ Approximate calculation of equilibria in the nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model: a linearization based approach ⋮ Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents ⋮ The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes
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