On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
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Publication:1792554
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.06.001zbMath1416.91015OpenAlexW2917253537MaRDI QIDQ1792554
Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, Andrea Attar
Publication date: 12 October 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26090/1/games.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (3)
Interactive Information Design ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
Cites Work
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