A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002zbMath1416.91129OpenAlexW3121305046WikidataQ129658617 ScholiaQ129658617MaRDI QIDQ1792557

Martin Bichler, Per Paulsen

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

market designspectrum auctionequilibrium strategiespackage auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design ⋮ Principal-agent problem under the linear contract

Cites Work

• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Optimal constrained bidding
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
• Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Optimal Delegation

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