A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data
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Publication:1792558
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.003zbMath1416.91024OpenAlexW2808839094WikidataQ129682621 ScholiaQ129682621MaRDI QIDQ1792558
Jean-Baptiste Tondji, Victor H. Aguiar, Roland Pongou
Publication date: 12 October 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.003
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Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ An experiment on demand commitment bargaining ⋮ An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power
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