(Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.04.007zbMath1416.91171OpenAlexW3125009269WikidataQ129802449 ScholiaQ129802449MaRDI QIDQ1792570

Theodoros M. Diasakos, Kostas Koufopoulos

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstream/1893/27633/1/YGAME2862main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionneutral optimuminterim incentive efficiencyinsurance market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard ⋮ Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection

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