Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
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Publication:1792571
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004zbMath1416.91233OpenAlexW2804311913WikidataQ129782001 ScholiaQ129782001MaRDI QIDQ1792571
Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama
Publication date: 12 October 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004
Related Items (7)
Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
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