Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004zbMath1416.91107OpenAlexW2520907815WikidataQ109043330 ScholiaQ109043330MaRDI QIDQ1792573

Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28680/070_hiasDP-E-47.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationmaskin monotonicityindependent domainnon-connected honesty standardspartial-honesty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

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