Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
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Publication:1792573
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004zbMath1416.91107OpenAlexW2520907815WikidataQ109043330 ScholiaQ109043330MaRDI QIDQ1792573
Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara
Publication date: 12 October 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28680/070_hiasDP-E-47.pdf
Nash implementationmaskin monotonicityindependent domainnon-connected honesty standardspartial-honesty
Related Items
Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
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