Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.003zbMath1416.91070OpenAlexW2883469943WikidataQ129503516 ScholiaQ129503516MaRDI QIDQ1792580

Eberhard Feess, Florian Kerzenmacher

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionexperimental economicslyingdishonestytruth-tellingreputation models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• hroot

Cites Work

• Dynamic psychological games
• Reference-dependent subjective expected utility.
• Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating
• Voting to Tell Others
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Promises and Partnership

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