Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect

DOI10.1155/2016/5412028zbMath1400.91274OpenAlexW2519024458WikidataQ59131583 ScholiaQ59131583MaRDI QIDQ1793302

Chengyuan Wang, Biao Luo, Chunyi Li

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/5412028

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Efficient Incentive Contracts
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Dusenberry's Ratcheting of Consumption: Optimal Dynamic Consumption and Investment Given Intolerance for any Decline in Standard of Living

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