A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s10700-015-9229-1zbMath1397.91045OpenAlexW2287806121MaRDI QIDQ1794867

Masahiro Inuiguchi, Satoshi Masuya

Publication date: 16 October 2018

Published in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10700-015-9229-1

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative gamenucleoluslower gamereference point gameupper game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value ⋮ Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information ⋮ Fuzzy games: a complement-consistent solution, axiomatizations and dynamic approaches ⋮ Extension of Owen value for the game with a coalition structure under the limited feasible coalition

Cites Work

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• Some characterizations of lower probabilities and other monotone capacities through the use of Möbius inversion
• Additive representations of non-additive measures and the Choquet integral
• Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games
• 1-concave basis for TU games and the library game
• A value for partially defined cooperative games
• Theory of capacities
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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