Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039zbMath1398.91100OpenAlexW2152719518WikidataQ81064687 ScholiaQ81064687MaRDI QIDQ1794909

Gerhard Jäger

Publication date: 16 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitysignaling gamesneutral stabilityevolutionary game theorycostly signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Learning with neighbours ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling ⋮ Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ The dynamics of costly signaling

Cites Work

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• Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Recurrence of the unfit
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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