Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1797579
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017zbMath1400.91121OpenAlexW2054446781WikidataQ51952245 ScholiaQ51952245MaRDI QIDQ1797579
Clint Bushman, Marco A. Janssen
Publication date: 22 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017
Related Items (15)
Equation-free analysis of agent-based models and systematic parameter determination ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games ⋮ The evolution of coercive institutional punishment ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments ⋮ When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game ⋮ Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation ⋮ Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations ⋮ Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Distinguishing punishing costly signals from nonpunishing costly signals can facilitate the emergence of altruistic punishment ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
