Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.025zbMath1400.91064OpenAlexW1980469407WikidataQ50780691 ScholiaQ50780691MaRDI QIDQ1798116

Sabin Lessard, Véronique Ladret

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.025

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryfixation probabilityone-third lawstructured coalescentiterated prisonner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory ⋮ Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population ⋮ First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game ⋮ Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game ⋮ Stochastic evolution of staying together ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation

Cites Work

• The coalescent and genealogical process in geographically structured population
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model
• The strong-migration limit in geographically structured populations
• The coalescent
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Genealogy and subpopulation differentiation under various models of population structure.
• A minimal derivation of convergence stability measures
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Probability of fixation under weak selection: a branching process unifying approach
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item