Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025zbMath1400.91073OpenAlexW2076039625WikidataQ51947471 ScholiaQ51947471MaRDI QIDQ1798746

Takuya Sekiguchi, Mayuko Nakamaru

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

punishmentupdating rulelattice-structured populationcompletely mixing population

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

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• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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