Commitment in first-price auctions
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Publication:1798804
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1069-5zbMath1416.91143OpenAlexW2737172899MaRDI QIDQ1798804
Publication date: 23 October 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160105-095011433
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems ⋮ Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion ⋮ Price competition or price leadership
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