Algorithms for computing the Shapley value of cooperative games on lattices

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2018.03.022zbMath1417.91054OpenAlexW2786727914MaRDI QIDQ1800390

Khaled Maafa, Mohammed Said Radjef, Lhouari Nourine

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.03.022

zbMATH Keywords

latticeShapley valuecooperative gamerestricted cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (4)

A Bayesian Monte Carlo method for computing the Shapley value: application to weighted voting and bin packing games ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ Interval-valued n-person Cooperative games with satisfactory degree constraints ⋮ On Shapley value interpretability in concept-based learning with formal concept analysis

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