Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
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Publication:1800965
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002zbMath1416.91109OpenAlexW2884542524WikidataQ109043142 ScholiaQ109043142MaRDI QIDQ1800965
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (5)
Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Cites Work
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