Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.005zbMath1416.91017OpenAlexW2887976922MaRDI QIDQ1800967

Zhigang Cao, Changjun Wang, Xiao-guang Yang, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Xu-jin Chen

Publication date: 26 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

embeddingstrategic complementssupermodular gamesnetwork gamesstrategic substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Characterizing monotone games

Cites Work

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