Strategic vote trading under complete information

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.009zbMath1416.91103OpenAlexW2739728576MaRDI QIDQ1800968

Nicholas Ziros, Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 26 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/03-17.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationstrategic market gamespower sharingvote tradingproportional justice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• One man, one bid
• Existence of competitive equilibria with externalities: a differential viewpoint
• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
• Implementation via approval mechanisms
• Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal Voting Rules

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