Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
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Publication:1800973
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.002zbMath1416.91038OpenAlexW2889138820WikidataQ129322306 ScholiaQ129322306MaRDI QIDQ1800973
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/52244/files/JME_78-96.pdf
maximinequilibrium selectionstochastic stabilityreference-dependent preferencesloss-aversionpayoff-dominance
Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (8)
Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
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