Monotone bargaining is Nash-solvable

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2018.04.013zbMath1418.91043arXiv1711.00940OpenAlexW2963581906WikidataQ129354462 ScholiaQ129354462MaRDI QIDQ1801037

Gleb A. Koshevoy, Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 26 October 2018

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00940

zbMATH Keywords

dealNash equilibriumtightnessNash-solvabilitygame formgame correspondencemonotone bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items

Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles

Uses Software

• JBool

Cites Work

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