Analysis of the single-permutation encrypted Davies-Meyer construction
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Publication:1801088
DOI10.1007/S10623-018-0470-9zbMath1442.94035OpenAlexW2790044991WikidataQ122654826 ScholiaQ122654826MaRDI QIDQ1801088
Benoît Cogliati, Yannick Seurin
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-018-0470-9
Related Items (9)
\(\mathsf{CENCPP}^\ast\): beyond-birthday-secure encryption from public permutations ⋮ Beyond-birthday secure domain-preserving PRFs from a single permutation ⋮ Multi-user security of the sum of truncated random permutations ⋮ Better security-efficiency trade-offs in permutation-based two-party computation ⋮ Provably secure reflection ciphers ⋮ Tight security analysis of 3-round key-alternating cipher with a single permutation ⋮ Mind the composition: birthday bound attacks on EWCDMD and SoKAC21 ⋮ Multi-user BBB security of public permutations based MAC ⋮ Quantum cryptanalysis of the full AES-256-based Davies-Meyer, Hirose and MJH hash functions
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