Forward induction in coordination games

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-MzbMath0775.90305OpenAlexW1985955147MaRDI QIDQ1801823

Robert Forsythe, Douglas V. De Jong, Russell Cooper, Thomas W. Ross

Publication date: 11 August 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-m

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (9)

Delegation Using Forward Induction ⋮ Limitations of dominance and forward induction: ⋮ Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment ⋮ On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Improving coordination in small-scale multi-agent deep reinforcement learning through memory-driven communication ⋮ Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection ⋮ Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction ⋮ Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence.

Cites Work

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• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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