Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
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Publication:1802039
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1037zbMath0803.90141OpenAlexW3125389585MaRDI QIDQ1802039
Publication date: 8 August 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4605.pdf
Related Items (16)
Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting ⋮ Multitrade bargaining ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Reserve prices in repeated auctions ⋮ Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades ⋮ Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests ⋮ Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns ⋮ Endogenous and exogenous commitment ⋮ Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions ⋮ Bargaining with imperfect commitment ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
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