On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2zbMath0770.90009OpenAlexW2031699640WikidataQ127884720 ScholiaQ127884720MaRDI QIDQ1802942

Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2

zbMATH Keywords

continuum of allocationscore of a linear assignment problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies. ⋮ Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets

Cites Work

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