Repeated games with finite automata

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Publication:1804012

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1002zbMath0801.90133OpenAlexW2048930017MaRDI QIDQ1804012

Elchanan Ben-Porath

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275511/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-180.pdf



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