A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1004zbMath0792.90021OpenAlexW2047232618MaRDI QIDQ1804014

Motty Perry, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1004

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumRubinstein's alternating-offers bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items (24)

Bidding rings: a bargaining approach ⋮ Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game ⋮ Multilateral bargaining with concession costs ⋮ A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money ⋮ Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game ⋮ A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time ⋮ Hiding and herding in market entry ⋮ Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. ⋮ Walrasian bargaining. ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining ⋮ Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining ⋮ Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games ⋮ Continuous-time stochastic games ⋮ Continuous-time games of timing ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information ⋮ Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games ⋮ Strategic bargaining with firm inventories ⋮ Delay in Trade Networks ⋮ UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining ⋮ Strategic choice of waiting and reaction times in bargaining ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

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