Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
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Publication:1804589
DOI10.1007/BF01227863zbMath0822.90041MaRDI QIDQ1804589
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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