Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

DOI10.1007/BF00999041zbMath0822.90026OpenAlexW2009426918WikidataQ113445394 ScholiaQ113445394MaRDI QIDQ1804596

Engelbert J. Dockner, Reinhard Neck

Publication date: 9 October 1995

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00999041

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamepolicy gamenoncooperative open-loop equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items

On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games, On the logic of fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union, Moving horizon control in dynamic games, Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU., Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making, Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games, The open-loop discounted linear quadratic differential game for regular higher order index descriptor systems, Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union

Cites Work

• Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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