Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

DOI10.1007/BF01215201zbMath0821.90039OpenAlexW1989353773WikidataQ59972912 ScholiaQ59972912MaRDI QIDQ1804606

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215201

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferences uniform rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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