Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

DOI10.1007/BF01215206zbMath0821.90009MaRDI QIDQ1804612

Thomas H. Noe, David C. Nachman

Publication date: 10 October 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private informationcapital investmentoptimal employment contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects

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